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DO REPURCHASING FIRMS SHAVE CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURES WHEN SIGNALING? 
Bishal BC, Grand Valley State University 
Yatin N. Bhagwat, Grand Valley State University  
Marinus De Bruine, Grand Valley State University 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper studies the extent of firm level over- and under-investment in capital projects 
among firms with excess cash flows. Whereas most prior research looks for either the signaling 
or free cash flow hypothesis, we find that the motives for share repurchases differ depending on 
the firm’s concurrent investments in capital projects. Our initial sample contains 3,417 firm-year 
observations from 1998 through 2014 where we match share repurchasing firm-year 
observations with non-repurchasing counterparts by 8-digit GICS industry code, by fiscal year, 
and by size. Using two sample t-tests, we find evidence that consistent with free cash flow 
explanations over-investment is concentrated in repurchasing firms that face relatively lower 
growth opportunities, while consistent with the signaling hypothesis under-investment is 
concentrated in repurchasing firms that face relatively higher growth opportunities. We also find 
that the market reaction to share repurchases corroborates our arguments. These findings 
support the assertion made by others that firms shave investments in order to signal their 
undervalued equity with share repurchases.  
Keywords: Share Repurchases, Capital Expenditures, Free Cash Flow, Signaling. 
INTRODUCTION 
Firms with excess cash flows may use that cash for different purposes: to pay dividends, 
to pay down debt, to repurchase their own shares, to make long term capital investments, or just 
hold it for future investment or emergency purposes. The firms may also use cash in any 
combination of the aforementioned ways. For example, Richardson (2006) finds that in a large 
sample during the period 1988-2002, the average firm with positive free cash flows over-invests 
20% of its free cash flow, and that such firms retain over 40% of their free cash flow as either 
cash or marketable securities. Since the interests of managers and shareholders may not always 
be aligned, managers may squander free cash flows by pursuing dubious acquisitions (Powell, 
2018). Because of the limitations of monitoring, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that 
managers in firms with excess cash may invest more than they should which is in the best 
interest of the managers but costly for its shareholders. Blanchard et al. (1994) provide the most 
direct evidence on this agency problem by documenting that eleven firms with windfall legal 
settlements appear to engage in wasteful expenditure.  
Why firms repurchase shares has been investigated and documented for more than twenty 
years. Firms repurchase shares for many reasons, including signaling undervaluation, distributing 
excess cash, accommodating stock option plans, and recalibrating financial leverage (Dittmar, 
2000; Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Among these different motives, the most widely accepted 
ones for share repurchases are signaling and free cash flow hypothesis, driven by the information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Excess cash flows present an opportunity for 
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signaling the manager’s private information about the future prospects of the firm (Ikenberry et 
al., 1995; Lie, 2005). Excess cash flows also present a problem when managers have incentives 
to invest in value-destroying projects (Jensen, 1986). Share repurchases can mitigate this agency 
problem by returning excess cash flows to shareholders (Grullon and Michaely, 2004; 
Richardson, 2006). While most prior research has focused on either the information signaling or 
the free cash flow hypothesis, this paper attempts to reconcile these two major explanations by 
focusing on the interactions of share repurchases with capital investment levels among firms 
with excess cash flows.  
Others have argued that firms with changing characteristics have – over time – different 
incentives to repurchase shares. Liang et.al (2013) uses firms’ life cycle stage to discriminate 
between growth firms and mature firms and argues that firms in the early stage of the life cycle 
face greater investment opportunities and more serious information asymmetry about the firm’s 
future operating performance. They find that firms in the early stage of the life cycle buy back 
shares to signal their future performance rather than to reduce free cash flow and, conversely, 
they find that firms in the later stage of the life cycle buy back shares to reduce free cash flow 
rather than to signal their future performance. Instead of using firm age as a proxy for life cycle 
stage in order to capture a firm’s future growth opportunities we propose a more direct ex ante 
measure: concurrent investments in capital projects.  We expect that firms that face relatively 
higher (lower) growth opportunities are likely to invest in more (fewer) capital projects. Firms in 
the growth stage and repositioning firms are the most likely firms to increase their capital 
expenditures, so we decide to use the concurrent change in capital expenditures to help us 
understand the information content behind share repurchases. 
Our motivation for adopting a similar approach is the realization that the results in 
Bhagwat and DeBruine (2018) where the authors find no difference in the level of or change in 
capital expenditures between share repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms – may be 
driven by two opposing forces. It is possible that some repurchasing firms are likely to over-
invest compared to their non-repurchasing peers (in support of the free cash flow hypothesis) 
while other repurchasing firms are likely to under-invest compared to their non-repurchasing 
peers (in support of the information signaling hypothesis) yielding no net difference between 
repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms.   
Starting with the dataset used in Bhagwat and DeBruine (2018), we separate the sample 
firm-year observations by the observable change in capital expenditures and examine the 
bifurcated sample for support of the free cash flow and the signaling hypothesis. We find that 
repurchasing firms facing relatively fewer growth opportunities are more likely to over-invest in 
capital projects while repurchasing firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to 
under-invest in capital projects. Even after removing all observations where firms may have 
repurchased shares for the purpose of boosting their EPS we obtain similar results. We follow up 
with an examination of the equity book-to-market ratios and find that – relative to their peers – 
those signaling firms improve their repurchase-adjusted book-to-market ratios. We submit this 
finding as evidence in support of the signaling hypothesis and conjecture that such firms shave 
capital expenditures in order to signal their undervalued equity. 
This study contributes to the research on the motives for share repurchases. We show that 
a firm’s motivation for repurchases is affected by the firm’s concurrent change in capital 
investments that reveal behavior consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis or the information 
signaling hypothesis. We also find that firms with a higher incentive to signal their undervalued 
equity to the market appear to shave their capital expenditures in order to repurchase shares. 
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What’s more, consistent with the signaling hypothesis, repurchasing firms are able to improve 
their equity book-to-market values compared to their peers.  
We believe that investors can be better informed about the motivation for share 
repurchases. First, we show that repurchasing firms with excess cash make sub-optimal 
investment decisions they tend to overinvest in capital projects when decreasing their capital 
expenditures and they tend to underinvest in capital projects when increasing their capital 
expenditures. In both cases share repurchases appear to carry some cost for investors. In the 
latter case, the potential cost of under-investment in capital projects due to the repurchase of 
shares is that such a decision may be value-destroying in the long run. In addition, we show that 
repurchasing firms with concurrent increases in capital expenditures are likely to be signaling 
their undervalued equity, and by knowing this relationship investors are more likely to pick up 
on that signal. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Prior research commonly focused on a single motive for share repurchases. For example, 
several studies use future growth opportunities, proxied by return on assets, in order to sort out 
the motivation for share repurchases. Analyzing open-market share repurchase announcements 
from 1984 through 2000, Grullon and Michaely (2004) hypothesize that repurchasing firms are 
signaling their private information to the market. They analyze the operating performance around 
the repurchase announcement by comparing them in the pre- and post-announcement period to 
similar-sized non-repurchasing firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. They find no evidence 
that repurchasing firms experience an improvement in future profitability relative to their peer 
firms and instead show that the future growth of repurchasing firms deteriorates. However, they 
provide evidence to suggest that – consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis – share 
repurchases are authorized to mitigate the potential over-investment problem. Similarly 
analyzing open-market repurchase announcements from that same time period, Lie (2005) finds 
that firms that actually repurchase shares have improved future performance as compared to 
similar-sized non-repurchasing firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. He finds that there is 
positive future growth after a buyback announcement and argues that the share repurchases are a 
signaling of the future prospects. Liang et al. (2013) point out that in both studies the authors 
focused on a single motivation while it is more likely that the firms’ motivation for share 
repurchases changed as their future growth opportunities evolved. They examine the impact of 
life cycle stage on the motivation for share repurchases and find that the two motivations co-exist 
in their sample: firms in the growth stage are more likely to repurchase shares in order to signal 
better future performance while firms in the mature stage are more likely to repurchase shares in 
order to prevent investing in wasteful projects. 
In their investigation of firm motivations for share repurchases, Liang et al. (2013) 
employ firm age to proxy for the firm’s life cycle stage which in turn proxies for the firm’s 
future growth opportunities. A more direct measure associated with future growth opportunities 
is the change in capital expenditures (CAPEX). Managers may increase or decrease CAPEX for 
various reasons. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that managers seek to maximize the 
market value of the firm when deciding their level of corporate capital expenditures.  Dalbor and 
Jiang (2013) find that growth opportunities, free cash flow, above-average corporate earnings, 
and size were positive determinants of CAPEX, while the economic recession was a negative 
determinant of CAPEX. We expect that firms facing higher growth opportunities are more 
inclined to increase their investment in capital projects while firms facing lower growth 
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opportunities are more inclined to decrease their investment in capital projects. If a firm’s 
motivation for share repurchases is tied to its future growth opportunities, then we expect to find 
that a firm’s motivation for share repurchases is also tied to changes in its concurrent investment 
in capital projects.  
Using a large sample from 1998 through 2014 matched on industry affiliation, fiscal year, 
size, and growth opportunities, Bhagwat and DeBruine (2018) find that repurchasing firms and 
their non-repurchasing counterpart make similar investments in capital expenditures. They also 
report that such repurchasing firms and their non-repurchasing counterparts make similar 
changes to their capital expenditures, and conclude that such results do not support the free cash 
flow hypothesis which says that firms with excess cash flows tend to over-invest in capital 
projects. Their measure of future growth opportunities is beginning-of-period asset market-to-
book also used in prior research (e.g., Almeida et al., 2016). In light of Liang et al. (2013) who 
show that firms’ motivations for share repurchases differ as they face different growth 
opportunities, and a new awareness that changes in CAPEX can proxy for future growth 
opportunities, we conjecture that those findings were caused by opposing forces within their 
sample. That is, some repurchasing firms facing lower growth opportunities are likely to over-
invest compared to their peers (in support of the free cash flow hypothesis) while other 
repurchasing firms facing higher growth opportunities are likely to under-invest compared to 
their peers (in support of the information signaling hypothesis) yielding no net difference 
between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. The latter firms under-invest in CAPEX in 
order to repurchase shares to send signal about their future growth prospect. In light of this, we 
re-examine the matched sample used in Bhagwat and DeBruine (2018) and separate the sample 
firm-observations based on whether firms increased or decreased their level of CAPEX.    
Within the CAPEX-decreasing sub-sample, we argue that repurchasing firms – using 
their excess cash – overinvest in CAPEX relative to their non- repurchasing counterparts. Such a 
result would be consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis and evidence in support of firms 
investing in underperforming projects as predicted by Jensen (1986) and documented by 
Richardson (2006) and Liang et al. (2013). As mentioned earlier, because of monitoring 
difficulties firm managers have an incentive to engage in wasteful spending that is in their best 
interest but costly to shareholders. If repurchasing firms over-invest then such firms don’t reduce 
their CAPEX as much as their non-repurchasing counterparts do. However, if repurchasing firms 
distribute all their excess free cash flow then the reduction in their CAPEX should be similar to 
that of their non-repurchasing counterparts. This leads to our first hypothesis that is stated here in 
a null form: 
 
H1:  Within the sub-sample of firms with decreased CAPEX, there is no difference in the decrease in 
CAPEX between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. 
 
where the repurchasing firm and its non-repurchasing counterpart are matched on industry 
affiliation, fiscal year, size, and growth opportunities. 
Within the sub-sample of CAPEX-increasing firms, managers face two opposing 
challenges. If the manager is comfortable with the valuation of her firm’s stock, she may invest 
in CAPEX as much as possible to either capture growth opportunities or consistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis to wastefully invest in undesirable capital projects. However, signal theory 
states that signals are given by managers to reduce information asymmetry (Utomo et al. 2018) 
and if the manager believes that her firm’s stock is undervalued, then she may want to balance an 
investment in CAPEX with share repurchases. This is consistent with the information signaling 
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hypothesis because such firms repurchase shares in order to signal the market about their 
undervalued equity. Tsetsekos et al. (1988) find in their survey that the majority of firms point to 
undervaluation as the primary motivation for share repurchases. Hence, if the manager believes 
that share repurchases are a proper tool for informing the market that their equity is undervalued 
then repurchasing firms may be motivated to shave capital expenditures in order to send such a 
signal to the market. This leads to our second hypothesis that is stated here in a null form: 
 
H2:  Within the sub-sample of firms with increased CAPEX, there is no difference in the increase in 
CAPEX between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. 
 
Where the repurchasing firm and its non-repurchasing counterpart are matched on industry 
affiliation, fiscal year, size, and growth opportunities. 
Next we posit that CAPEX-increasing firms (relative to CAPEX-decreasing firms) have a 
more compelling reason to shave their capital projects in order to signal undervaluation. Phrased 
differently, to the extent CAPEX-increasing firms want to send the market a signal, such firms 
may repurchase shares by shaving their investments in CAPEX. If successful, those repurchasing 
firms facing an improving investment opportunity set should see an additional bump in their 
market value relative to their non-repurchasing counterparts. We argue that CAPEX-increasing 
repurchasing firms (“signaling firms”) will experience more of a decrease or less of an increase 
in their equity book-to-market ratios as compared to their non-repurchasing CAPEX-increasing 
counterparts. We limit our test horizon to concurrent equity book-to-market changes even though 
previous studies suggest that the long-run return of repurchasing firms is positively correlated 
with the equity book-to-market ratio. For example, Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Chan et al. (2004) 
find that high equity book-to-market repurchasing firms experience abnormal stock returns of 
more than 30% in four years following the repurchase announcement date. This leads to our third 
hypothesis that is stated here in a null form: 
 
H3:  Within the sub-sample of firms with increased CAPEX, there is no difference in the change in 
equity book-to-market ratios between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. 
  
where the change in the equity book-to-market ratios is adjusted for the effect of any share 
repurchases during the period.  
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Bhagwat and DeBruine (2018) find that on average repurchasing firms make similar 
changes in their capital expenditures as their non-repurchasing counterparts. In this paper, we 
argue that their result may well be hiding the fact that some repurchasing firms may be over-
investing as compared to their non-repurchasing counterparts while other repurchasing firms are 
under-investing as compared to their non-repurchasing counterparts. We start with a description 
of their sample of 3,417 firm-year matches.   
The Bhagwat and DeBruine sample contains firm-year observations from the 1998-2014 
period and controls for differential business cycle impacts by matching repurchasing firm-year 
observations with non-repurchasing counterparts by 8-digit GICS industry code, by year, and by 
size. Others (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Lie, 2005) matched by 2-digit SIC code but these 
authors believe that using 116 different subindustries helps eliminate matches of firms that differ 
significantly in their operations. They use beginning-of-year total assets to match on size because 
size can differentiate firms on dimensions such as profitability (due to economies of scale), 
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growth opportunities and free cash flows (due to life cycle stage), and leverage (smaller firms are 
perceived to be more risky and thus have a larger proportion of equity in their capital structure). 
To further control the effects of size on the firm characteristics they standardize the 
characteristics by dividing them by the beginning-of-year total assets. Following Almeida et al. 
(2016) and others, they apply a 98% winsorization to cut down on spurious outliers. Table 1 
presents the firm characteristics of their initial sample of 3,417 matched firm-year observations. 
 
Table 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MATCHED FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS 
Initial sample Repurchasing firm-years Non-repurchasing firm-years 
   # of observations 3,417 3,417 
   # of firms 1,776 1,868 
Firm characteristics Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
   Net repurchasest 0.071 0.042 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   Capital expenditurest (CAPEXt) 0.060 0.033 0.076 0.061 0.033 0.081 
   Change in CAPEXt -0.003 -0.001 0.056 -0.012 -0.001 0.105 
   Cash plus securitiest-1 0.249 0.192 0.223 0.197 0.109 0.222 
   Available fundst-1 0.359 0.322 0.237 0.217 0.165 0.256 
   ROAt-1 0.044 0.065 0.148 -0.058 0.013 0.293 
   LEVt-1 0.133 0.057 0.171 0.245 0.187 0.298 
   AMtBt-1 2.101 1.675 1.389 2.019 1.393 3.681 
   EBtMt-1 0.568 0.454 0.456 0.584 0.488 2.620 
 
Table 1 reveals that as a proportion of total assets capital expenditures and changes 
therein appear very similar for the matched firms. However, repurchasing firms appear to on 
average have more liquid assets in Cash plus securities (25% vs. 20% of total assets) and 
Available funds (36% vs. 22% of total assets), where Available funds are defined as the previous 
period’s Cash from Operations added to the beginning-of-period Cash plus securities. The 
repurchasing firms also show higher return on asset (ROA) values (4% vs. -6%), and lower 
Leverage (LEV) values (13% vs. 25% of total assets) at the beginning of their repurchasing year 
as compared to their similarly-sized non-repurchasing counterparts. 
As mentioned before, their analysis of the full sample shows that repurchasing firms and 
their non-repurchasing counterparts are similar in terms of their capital expenditures and the 
changes therein. Table 2 illustrates how their sample separates into sets of firm-years that are 
matched based on changes in capital expenditures from one period to the next. 
 
Table 2 
CHANGES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Variables  Share repurchasing sample with 
peers 
Share repurchasing sample 
without peers 
CAPEX decreasing 1,093 723 
CAPEX increasing 768 833 
Final Sample with matched peers 1,861  
  
Table 2 shows that of our initial 3,417 firm year observations, 1,093 firm-year 
observations consist of CAPEX-decreasing repurchasing firms that have matching CAPEX-
decreasing non-repurchasing counterparts (“peers”) and 768 firm-year observations consist of 
CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms that have matching CAPEX-increasing non-repurchasing 
counterparts (“peers”). We dropped 723 CAPEX-increasing and 833 CAPEX-decreasing 
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repurchasing firm year observations from our study because we were unable to find a match for 
these observations.  
Before comparing the repurchasing firms to their peers we compare the CAPEX-
increasing to the CAPEX-decreasing repurchasing firms and analyze their differences and 
similarities. Table 3 shows that the CAPEX-increasing and CAPEX-decreasing repurchasing 
firms appear to be similar on the various characteristics deemed relevant to supporting the free 
cash flow hypothesis.  
 
Table 3 
CHARACTERISTICS OF REPURCHASING FIRM-YEARS BY CHANGE IN CAPEXt 
Change in CAPEXt Decreasing Increasing Two-sample t-tests 
# of observations 1,093 768 H0: Mean difference=0 
Standardized characteristics Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
CAPEXt 0.045 0.077 -8.693 0.000 
Net repurchasest 0.070 0.068 0.433 0.665 
Cash plus securitiest-1 0.255 0.241 1.406 0.160 
Available fundst-1 0.356 0.359 -0.265 0.791 
ROAt-1 0.039 0.044 -0.637 0.524 
LEVt-1 0.135 0.139 -0.502 0.616 
AMtBt-1 2.039 2.155 -1.734 0.083 
Change in AMtBt-1 -0.405 0.113 -5.558 0.000 
Sizet-1 2.282 2.433 -4.150 0.000 
 
 By construction, the two sets of repurchasing firms in Table 3 differ significantly in the 
level of capital expenditures (t=-8.693; p=0.000). However, on average the two sets make similar 
repurchases during the period, have similar funds available at the beginning of the period, show 
similar returns on assets for the prior period, and are similarly leveraged at the beginning of the 
period. Not surprisingly, the CAPEX-increasing firms face slightly higher growth opportunities 
(t=-1.734; p=0.083) as proxied by their beginning-of-period asset market-to-book and 
experienced a significant difference in the change of their growth opportunity set (t=-5.558; 
p=0.000) in the prior year. Finally, CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms are about $75 million 
larger (t=-4.150; p=0.000) as proxied by the logarithm of their beginning-of-period total assets.  
 The next section will examine the current sample made up of 768 CAPEX-increasing 
matches and 1,093 CAPEX-decreasing matches. Before discussing the results it is useful to re-
iterate that our sample is similar to that employed in Liang et al. (2013) with the exception that 
we use changes in concurrent CAPEX rather than firm age to proxy for future growth 
opportunities. With firm age as the proxy for growth opportunities, managers are still forced into 
a single motivation for share repurchases for multiple years. As a result of our change in 
concurrent CAPEX choice, we allow firms and their managers to change their motivation for 
share repurchases on an annual basis. In our view this is a more realistic scenario.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 4 present our evidence for H1 and H2. Table 4 shows that the 1,093 CAPEX-
decreasing repurchasing observations do not reduce their capital expenditures as much as their 
peers. The difference is significant, both statistically (t=4.705; p=0.000) and economically as a 
percentage of total assets (-0.030 versus -0.049), and serves to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference in the decrease in CAPEX between repurchasing firms and their non-
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repurchasing peers. We take this as evidence that on average these repurchasing firms over-
invest in capital projects because they have the excess funds to do so. This evidence is consistent 
with H1 and the free cash flow hypothesis.  
 
Table 4 
REPURCHASES AND CHANGES IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Change in CAPEXt Decreasing Increasing 
# of matches 1,093 768 
Repurchasing shares Yes No Yes No 
Standardized characteristics Mean Mean Mean Mean 
CAPEXt 0.045 0.047 0.077 0.088 
Change in CAPEXt -0.030 -0.049 0.027 0.039 
Two-sample t-test t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
H0: Mean difference=0  4.705 0.000 -3.167 0.002 
 
 The right-hand column of Table 4 comprises the repurchasing firms that in the same 
peirod increase their capital expenditures. It shows that the 768 CAPEX-increasing repurchasing 
observations do not increase their capital expenditures as much as their peers do.  The difference 
is again significant, both statistically (t=-3.167; p=0.002) and economically as a percentage of 
total assets (0.027 versus 0.039), and serves to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in the increase in CAPEX between repurchasing firms and their non-repurchasing 
peers. We take this as evidence that on average these repurchasing firms under-invest in capital 
projects. This finding is consistent with our H2 and the signaling hypothesis; that is, if 
management believes that share repurchases are a proper tool for informing the market that their 
equity is undervalued then repurchasing firms may be motivated to shave capital expenditures in 
order to signal the market. In terms of frequency, more than 40% (768 ÷ 1861) of the 
repurchasing firms appear inclined to shave investments in order to repurchase shares. 
The result in the right-hand column of Table 4 is also consistent with the EPS-
management hypothesis that states that firms repurchase shares in order to boost their earnings 
per share (EPS). Oded and Michel (2008) estimate that about 16% of the EPS increase during the 
2002-2006 period can be traced to share repurchases. Prior studies in earnings management has 
established that EPS-motivated repurchases can explain the shaving of capital expenditures and 
other investments (e.g., Hribar et al., 2006, Almeida et al., 2016). We use their approach to 
eliminate EPS-motivated repurchasing observations from the set. Accordingly, we remove all 
repurchasing firm-year observations (together with their peers) for which the repurchases 1) 
changed the EPS surprise from negative to positive in any of the four quarters 59 observations or 
2) increased the reported EPS by at least one penny in any of the four quarters 135 observations.  
In order to carry out that approach we use analysts’ consensus EPS announcements that 
are available from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) database. Many of the 
smaller firms (with average beginning-of-year total assets of less than $500 million) do not 
appear in the IBES database and are also dropped from the set. Table 5 illustrates that the over-
investing and under-investing persists albeit slightly less significant for the reduced sets after 
removing all EPS-motivated repurchases.  
 The left-hand column in Table 5 shows that even with the EPS-motivated 
repurchases removed CAPEX-decreasing repurchasing firms over-invest in capital projects (t= 
2.390; p=0.017) as compared to their peers. The right-hand column of Table 5 shows that even 
with the EPS-motivated repurchases removed CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms do not 
increase their capital expenditures as much as their peers (t=-2.427; p=0.016) and thus appear to 
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under-invest in capital projects. Hence, these results are not driven by EPS-motivated share 
repurchases and suggest that CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms may shave capital 
expenditures in order to signal their undervalued equity to the market. In terms of frequency, 
more than 40% (413 ÷ 946) of the repurchasing firms appear inclined to shave investments in 
order to repurchase shares. 
 
Table 5 
IBES-MATCHED AND ADJUSTED FOR EPS-MOTIVATED REPURCHASES 
Change in CAPEXt Decreasing Increasing 
# of matches 533 413 
Repurchasing shares Yes No Yes No 
Standardized characteristics Mean Mean Mean Mean 
CAPEXt 0.043 0.044 0.071 0.084 
Change in CAPEXt -0.027 -0.038 0.022 0.033 
Two-sample t-test t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
H0: Mean difference=0  2.390 0.017 -2.427 0.016 
 
We now turn to the impact of this purported signaling behavior on equity valuation as 
measured by the change in book-to-market ratios. We prefer the book-to-market ratio to the more 
popular market-to-book ratio because the former behaves less volatile, especially when book 
values turn negative. A decrease in the book-to-market ratio reflects investors’ expectation that 
the firm will perform better in the future, so a higher decrease can be viewed as evidence of 
successful signaling. Conversely, an increase in the book-to-market ratio reflects investors’ 
expectations that the firm will perform worse in the future, so a lower increase can be viewed as 
evidence of successful signaling. Table 6 presents the change in repurchase-adjusted book-to-
market ratios for our sets of CAPEX-decreasing and CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms and 
their respective peers. 
 
Table 6 
SIGNALING WITH OTHER THAN EPS-MOTIVATED REPURCHASES 
Change in CAPEXt Decreasing Increasing 
# of matches 533 413 
Repurchasing shares Yes No Yes No 
Standardized characteristics Mean Mean Mean Mean 
EBtMt-1 0.517 0.722 0.469 0.387 
RepAdj-EBtMt 0.621 0.809 0.497 0.533 
Change in RepAdj-EBtMt 0.100 0.092 0.033 0.121 
Two-sample t-test t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
H0: Mean difference=0  0.229 0.819 -2.525 0.012 
 
The right-hand column of Table 6 presents our evidence for H3. We document that 
CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms have significantly lower changes in equity book-to-
market values during the period when compared to their peers (t=-2.525; p=0.012) which is 
consistent with H3. We take this finding as evidence that CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms 
(“signaling firms”) are successful in getting their undervalued status remedied by the market – if 
they indeed signal with their repurchases. The book-to-market value of their peers on average 
increases by 31% (= 0.121/0.387) compared to 7% (= 0.033/0.469) increase posted by the 
CAPEX-increasing repurchasing firms. The signaling firms start the year with on average higher 
book-to-market values than their peers that in turn may encourage management to repurchase 
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shares even if that means shaving capital expenditures. What’s more, compared to their peers 
those repurchasing firms are able to improve their book-to-market values while at the same time 
under-investing in capital projects. If these firms successfully signal the market about their future 
good prospects with share repurchases then it is likely that this shaving behavior will continue in 
future years. 
Finally, the left-hand column in Table 6 shows that CAPEX-decreasing repurchasing 
firms and their peers have similar changes in book-to-market values during the period (t=0.229; 
p=0.819). This may be because CAPEX-decreasing repurchasing firms facing relatively lower 
growth opportunities may not be successful in sending a credible signal to the market through 
their share repurchases. This implies that the market may not respond to share repurchases, as 
intended, for such CAPEX-decreasing firms. 
CONCLUSION 
This study analyzes firms’ decisions regarding share repurchases and CAPEX. In doing 
so, we provide a justification as to why Bhagwat and DeBruine (2018) found no difference in 
capital expenditures between share repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms. Starting with 
a sample of 3,417 firm-year observations from 1998-2014 that was matched on industry 
affiliation, year, size, and growth opportunities, we show that some repurchasing firms are likely 
to over-invest their peers and other repurchasing firms are likely to under-invest their peers. We 
advance likely explanations from the literature for each of these actions, and go on to show that 
if firms shave capital expenditures in order to repurchase shares, the market appears to recognize 
and reward that behavior.  
A caveat of our study is that we do not consider the role of conservatism in mitigating the 
over investment problem. Penman and Zhang (2002) find that in the presence of conservative 
accounting cutting investments can increase reported earnings. While Jensen (1986) identifies 
share repurchases as a way to mitigate agency problem, more recent studies (e.g., Louis and 
Urcan, 2015 and Lobo et al., 2019) identify conservatism as a mechanism to mitigate the same 
agency problem. Moreover, Lara et al. (2016) find that “Conservatism, by imposing timely 
reporting of losses, makes such self-interested decisions apparent sooner, enabling stakeholders 
to discipline managers, if necessary, and deterring such conduct in the future.” Since our test are 
not powerful enough to explore how conservatism would affect the extent of firm level over- and 
under-investment in capital projects among firms with excess cash flows, we are unable to 
explore the implications of conservatism in our setting. However, if conservatism serves as an 
alternative to share repurchases then it would more likely be used by the non-repurchasing 
counterparts in the sample, reducing their equity book-to-market ratios further than they would 
otherwise, and thereby making our reported results on the difference in changes in concurrent 
equity book-to-market ratios even more powerful. 
REFERENCES 
Almeida, H., Fos, V., & Kronlund, M. (2016). The real effects of share repurchase. Journal of Financial Economics, 
119(1), 168-185. 
Berger, P.G., & Hann, R. (2003). The impact of SFAS No. 131 on information and monitoring. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 41(2), 163-223. 
Bhagwat, Y.N., & DeBruine, M. (2018). Do firms shave capital expenditures when repurchasing shares? Academy 
of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 22(6). 
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal                                                                             Volume 23, Issue 4, 2019 
 
 
                                                                                                        11                                                                     1528-2635-23-4-436 
Blanchard, O.J., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1994). What do firms do with cash windfalls? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 36(3), 337-360. 
Chan, K., Ikenberry, D., & Lee, I. (2004). Economic sources of gain in stock repurchases. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 39(3), 461-479.  
Comment, R., & Jarrell, G.A. (1991). The relative signaling power of Dutch-auction and fixed-price self-tender 
offers and open-market share repurchases. The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1243-1271. 
Dalbor, M., & Jiang, L. (2013). Determinants of capital expenditures in the US restaurant industry. The Journal of 
Hospitality Financial Management, 21(2), 77-86. 
Dittmar, A.K. (2000). Why do firms repurchase stock. The Journal of Business, 73(3), 331-355. 
Dittmar, A.K., & Dittmar, R.F. (2008). The timing of financing decisions: An examination of the correlation in 
financing waves. Journal of Financial Economics, 90, 59-83. 
Grullon, G., & Ikenberry, D.L. (2000). What do we know about stock repurchases? Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, 13(1), 31-51. 
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2004). The information content of share repurchase programs. The Journal of Finance, 
59(2), 651-680. 
Hribar, P., Jenkins, N.T., & Johnson, W.B. (2006). Stock repurchases as an earnings management device. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 41(1-2), 3-27. 
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., & Vermaelen, T. (1995). Market underreaction to open market share repurchases. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 39(2-3), 181-208. 
Jensen, M.C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic 
Review, 76(2), 323-329. 
Kurt, A.C. (2018). Managing EPS and signaling undervaluation as a motivation for repurchases: The case of 
accelerated share repurchases. Review of Accounting and Finance, 17(4), 453-481. 
Lara, J.M.G., Osma, B.G., & Penalva, F. (2016). Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 61(1), 221-238. 
Liang, W. L., Chan, K., Lai, W. H., & Wang, Y. (2013). Motivation for repurchases: A life cycle explanation. 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 43(2), 221-242. 
Lie, E. (2005). Operating performance following open market share repurchase announcements. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 39(3), 411-436. 
Lobo, G.J., Robin, A., & Wu, K. (2019). Share repurchases and accounting conservatism. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 1-35. 
Louis H., & Urcan O. (2015). Agency conflicts, dividend payout, and the direct benefits of conservative financial 
reporting to equity-holders. Contemporary Accounting Research 32(2), 455-484 
McConnell, J.J., & Muscarella, C.J. (1985). Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the 
firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(3), 399-422. 
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (1999). The determinants and implications of corporate cash 
holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 52(1), 3-46. 
Penman, S.H., & Zhang, X.J. (2002). Accounting conservatism, the quality of earnings, and stock returns. The 
Accounting Review, 77(2), 237-264. 
Powell, G.E. (2018). The financial determinants of corporate cash holdings for Indonesian firms. Academy of 
Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 22(1), 1-12. 
Richardson, S. (2006). Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2-3), 159-189. 
Stulz, R. (1990). Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(1), 3-27. 
Tsetsekos, G.P., Kaufman, D.J., & Gitman, L.J. (1991). A survey of stock repurchase motivations and practices of 
major US corporations. Journal of Applied Business Research, 7(3), 15-21. 
Utomo, D., Pamungkas, I.D., & Machmuddah, Z. (2018). The moderating effects of managerial ownership on 
accounting conservatism and quality of earnings. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 
22(6), 1-11. 
